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Abstract
In an incomplete contract setting, we analyze the contracting out of
public service provision, comparing the performance of for-prot and not-for-
prot private rms. Two institutional arrangements are considered, control
rights lying either with the rm as under the UKs Private Finance Initiative
(PFI) or the government (as under traditional procurement).
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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a steady stream of innovations in the way public
services are provided. In the UK, under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), it
has become common for the government to contract out the provision of public
services to a consortium of private rms that designs, nances, builds and man-
ages the facilities concerned (HM Treasury, 2003). In Canada, such public-private
partnerships have been used for major infrastructure projects, such as the 407
Express Toll Route to the north of Toronto and the redevelopment of Pearson
International Airport (Daniels and Trebilcock, 2000), while in the US, in much of
the European Union, and in developing economies, there has been increasing use
of similar schemes (Linder and Rosenau, 2000). This approach contrasts sharply
with the way public services have traditionally been procured. Under traditional
procurement, the government species the inputs and retains control rights over
how the service is delivered. Instead, under PFI, the government species the
output, that is, it species a basic service standard, but it is the rm that has
control rights over how to deliver the service.
Not-for-prot rms (NPs) have long been established in public service provi-
sion, for example in health and education. However, there has recently been an
extensively-debated expansion in the role of NPs (see Bennett et al., 2003; IPPR
2003, and Weisbrod 1997). An important recent example in the UK is the respon-
sibility for rail track facilities that the government has given to the NP, Network
Rail. Among the other well-publicized cases are Glas Cymru, which was created
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on a private initiative in April 2000 as a holding company for the assets of Dwr
Cymru, the Welsh water utility, and NAV Canada, which was established in 1996,
and owns and operates Canadas civil air navigation service.
In this paper, we analyze the contracting out of service provision to private
rms, and we compare the case in which the contractor is an NP to that in which
it is a for-prot rm (FP). We consider these cases under two di¤erent institutional
arrangements. The rst is traditional procurement, under which the government
retains control rights over the project; the second is PFI, the rm having control
rights. We take an incomplete-contract approach (see, e.g., Hart, 1995), build-
ing on the seminal work on public service provision by Hart, Shleifer and Vishny
(1997). We assume that the rm may make an observable but unveriable in-
vestment, researching innovative approaches to perform its task in excess of the
basic standard specied in the initial contract. We assume that an innovation,
if implemented, has an e¤ect both on the social benet that is generated by the
production of the public service and on the rms prot. Control rights (i.e., own-
ership of the project) give the power of veto over the implementation of any given
innovation.
Whereas an FP may be assumed to maximize prots, an NP operates under a
non-distribution constraint, which bans it from redistributing prot to its mem-
bers. Also, an may be founded with a specic mission in mind, and users and
stakeholders participate on its board of trustees. To capture these considerations
as simply as possible, we assume that the NPs objective is to maximize benets,
though subject to a prot constraint. Such a constraint is particularly important
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for an NP because, unlike an FP, it does not have the option of raising funds on the
stock market. This approach contrasts with that of Glaeser and Shleifer (2001),
who include prots directly in the NPs objective function, but with a lower value
attached than is the case for an FP: prots are valuable to the NP only insofar
as they permit consumption of perquisites and the building up of precautionary
nancial reserves.
We compare the investment incentives of an FP and an NP under di¤erent
institutional arrangements, noting the implications for di¤erent types of public
services. We consider three alternative scenarios. In the rst, implementation of
an investment increases both the contractors prot and social benet (we refer
to this as protable quality improvement). For example, the investment may be
in asset quality (e.g., of a hospital or a school building) that generates both lower
maintenance costs for the contractor and greater social benet from the use of the
asset for public service provision (e.g., fewer disruptions to teaching or a better
healing environment). In contrast, the second and the third scenarios are charac-
terized by a conict between social benet and prot. In the second (unprotable
quality improvement) this occurs because implementation of an investment that
increases social benet is costly and, in the absence of a side-payment from the
government, will cut the contractors prot. For example, implementation of the
investment might improve safety, but the original contract may not o¤er scope to
raise revenue to cover the costs of implementation. In the third (cost cutting at
the expense of quality) implementation of an investment increases prot, but has
an adverse impact on social benet. For example, a cost-cutting innovation might
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compromise safety. We show that
Our results show that the appropriate institutional arrangement depends on
which scenario obtains, can be summarized as follows...
The theoretical literature on the provision of public services is expanding
rapidly. Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Schmitz (2000), and King and Pitchford
(2001) compare public provision with contracting out to an FP. The optimality
of bundling building and managing operations in PFI projects with FPs is dis-
cussed by Bennett and Iossa (2006) and Hart (2002) under incomplete contracts,
and by Bentz, Grout and Halonen (2001) under complete contracts. Bundling in
an incomplete-contract model is also analyzed by Bös and De Fraja (2002), who
examine the case of health care for which quality is unveriable. However, none
of these papers considers public service provision by NPs.
There is also an extensive literature on NPs, though, for many years, its main
focus was on the relationship between the rm and its donors (see e.g. Rose-
Ackerman, 1996). However, a related branch of the literature considers NPs that
do not rely on donations (see Hansmann, 1986, 1996). A recent formulation by
Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) examines why an entrepreneur setting up a rm might
prefer to make it an NP. In their model, as in ours, an NP generates perquisites for
an entrepreneur that are not as valuable as income, so that, relative to a FP, the
NP has weaker prot incentives. Closer to our work is that of Besley and Ghatak
(2001). In their model, as in ours, a critical role is played by the service providers
valuation of social benet. They show that control rights should be left with the
party that values services more highly, thus indicating a role for benevolentNPs.
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However, contrary to us, they do not consider PFI - which is shown in our analysis
to widen the potential role for NPs in e¤ective public service provision.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model, while in Section
3 we compare the e¤ects of the di¤erent institutional arrangements. Section 4
provides some extensions and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a setting where, initially, the government and the rm agree a con-
tract that species observable and veriable basic standards for the provision of a
public service. However, before operations begin, the rm may make an observ-
able but unveriable investment, which we denote by x  0, researching innovative
approaches to performing its task in excess of the basic standard. The cost of this
investment in monetary terms is C(x), which, for simplicity, we shall assume that
it is quadratic: C(x) = x2=2. The investment cannot be contracted upon ex ante,
for it is not possible to specify in advance the delivery of a specic innovation.
We assume that an innovation, if implemented, a¤ects both the prot and the
social benet generated by the provision of the public service. In our solutions,
innovation x is implemented, and so we economize on notation by writing social
benet and prot as functions of x.
The social benet generated by the provision of the public service is
B(x) = B0 + bx; (b > 0) (1)
where B0 is a positive constant denoting veriable basic standards and  is a shift
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parameter whose value is either 1 or  1. If  = 1, x increases social benet; if
 =  1, x decreases social benet.
Gross prot is dened to be
(x) = 0 + x; ( > 0) (2)
where 0 is the default prot that the rm would obtain if it set x = 0.  is a shift
parameter whose value is either 1 or  1: if  = 1, x increases prot;. if  =  1, x
decreases prot. We assume that B(x) and  (x) are observable but unveriable.
Net prot ^(x) is dened also to include the investment cost C(x) and the
monetary transfer z that is received from the government should bargaining occur
in order to get the rm to institute the innovation x. Thus,
^(x) = 0 + x  C(x) + z.
An FP chooses x to maximize net prot ^(x). An NP chooses x so as to
maximize benets, subject to a net prot constraint; that is, its objective function
is
max
x
B(x) subject to 0 + x  C(x) + z  .
 is a parameter which, for now, we assume equals 0, implying that, if we disre-
gard the prot 0 that would be achieved by satisfying basic standards, any further
prot x  C(x) + z (the prot related to innovation) must be non-negative.
The government is assumed to maximize B(x) z0 z, where z0 is the payment
it makes for satisfying basic standards; that is, it maximizes benets minus any
payments to the rm.1
1We are assuming here that the governmentis a government agency, such as a local govern-
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We focus on the following three scenarios (examples of which are discussed in
Section 4):
(a) Protable quality improvement : implementation of innovation x raises both
social benet and the rms prot ( =  = 1).
(b) Unprotable quality improvement : implementation of innovation x raises
social benet but cuts the rms prot ( = 1;  =  1).
(c) Cost cutting at the expense of quality: implementation of innovation x raises
the rms prot but cuts social benet ( =  1;  = 1).
We compare two institutional arrangements: the private nance initiative (PFI)
and traditional procurement. We assume that under PFI the rm has control rights
over the project, being free to implement the innovation without consulting the
government. Under traditional procurement, however, the government has control
rights over the project, and if there are gains from implementing the innovation,
bargaining between the rm and the government will take place. We assume
the simplest possible form of alternating o¤ers bargaining is used, with each side
having a chance that it will be the one to make the o¤er. The other side then
chooses whether to accept the o¤er, with implementation of the innovation taking
place, or it rejects the o¤er, in which case there is no implementation. Thus, we
assume that the government makes the o¤er with probability  2 [0; 1], while the
rm makes the o¤er with probability 1 .2 In the absence of a budget constraint
the solution is then equivalent to a Nash bargain with bargaining weights of  and
ment or ministry, with its own objectives, rather than an abstract welfare-maximizing govern-
ment.
2Reference justifying this approach.
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1  . For simplicity, we assume for now that  = 1=2.
As a benchmark, we specify the rst-best solution. We dene welfare W (x) to
be the sum of benets, gross prots and (negatively) the investment cost; that is,
W (x) = B(x) + (x)  C(x). (3)
The rst-best investment x maximizes W (x). We assume for now that b > ,
that is, the dominant e¤ect of an innovation is on benets. (The reverse of this
inequality is considered in the next section.) x is therefore given, for the respective
cases, by
(a) x = b+ ;
(b) x = b  ; (4)
(c) x = 0.
In this setting, for each institutional arrangement, PFI and traditional pro-
curement, and for each type of rm, FP or NP, we compare investment levels, and
thus welfare levels. The timing of the game is as follows. In period 0 the govern-
ment sets the basic standards of service provision. In period 1 the contractor (FP
or NP) undertakes investment x researching improved methods for performing its
task in excess of the basic standards. In period 2, if the government has control
rights (traditional procurement), and if there would be gains from implementing
the innovation, bargaining between the rm and the government takes place; if
instead the rm has control rights (PFI), it is free to implement the innovation
without consulting the government. In period 3 the service is provided.
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2.1 PFI
We assume in this section that the rm has control rights over the project. We
consider what happens to investment rst when the rm is FP and then when it
is NP.
When the rm is an FP it chooses x to maximize ^(x), as given by (2). Thus,
writing xFp for the level of x it chooses, we have
(a) xFp = ;
(b) xFp = 0; (5)
(c) xFp = .
In cases (a) and (c), with prot is increasing in x, an interior solution obtains; and
in case (b), with prots decreasing in x, the FP does not invest. In each case the
solution is di¤erent to the rst-best because the FP does not take into account the
e¤ect of x on benets. In cases (a) and (b) xFp < x
 since the FP does not take
into account the positive e¤ect of x on B; in case (c) xFp > x
 since the FP does
not take into account the negative e¤ect of x on benets:
Suppose now that the rm is an NP, maximizing B(x) subject to its budget
constraint. Denote its investment by x = xNp . In case (a) both benets and gross
prot are increasing in x, and so the NP invests up to the point at which the
budget constraint is binding; that is, xNp   C(xNp ) = 0. Thus,
(a) xNp = 2. (6)
In case (b), although x increases benets, it is unprotable, while in case (c) x
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decreases benets. Therefore the NP does not invest in either case:
(b,c) xNp = 0. (7)
Compared to the rst-best, it is seen that in case (a) there is underinvestment,
given that b > . Since B is increasing in x, the NP invests up to where the budget
constraint binds. Since  is low, compared to b, the budget constraint binds at
a point from which welfare could have been raised by further increasing x, but
the budget constraint prevents the NP from doing so. In case (b) the rst-best
involves positive investment since b > ; but the budget constraint prevents any
investment, and so there is underinvestment compared to the rst-best. In case
(c) xNp = x
 since both are zero.
These conclusions lead immediately to our rst proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider PFI for b >  and  = 0. In case (a) xFp < x
N
p < x
;
there is underinvestment under both arrangements, but investment and welfare is
greater with an NP than with an FP. In case (b) xFp = x
N
p < x
; there is the same
amount of underinvestment under each arrangement. In case (c) xFp > x
N
p =
x; the provision by the NP yields the rst-best level of investment, but there is
overinvestment by an FP. Taking the three cases together, the NP weakly dominates
the FP in welfare terms.
2.2 Traditional Procurement
We now turn to traditional procurement, the government having control rights.
Then an innovation cannot be implemented without the governments approval. If
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there are positive gains from implementation, it is reasonable to expect bargaining
between the rm and the government to occur. We assume that the outside option
is zero for each player. Hence, if bargaining occurs the default payo¤ for each
player is the payo¤ that would obtain if there were no implementation of x and
only the basic standards were achieved. Thus, respective the default payo¤s are
B0   z0  V0 for the government, 0 for an FP and B0 for an NP.
Suppose rst that the rm is an FP. With bargaining, if the FP makes the
o¤er, the best it can do is ask the government to pay the amount that makes the
government indi¤erent between agreeing to the o¤er or not; that is, the o¤er the
FP makes is z = bx. If the government makes the o¤er, the best it can do is
ask the FP to pay the amount for which the FP is indi¤erent between accepting
or not; that is, the government makes the o¤er z =  x.3 Hence, given the
simple formulation of alternating-o¤ers bargaining, there is an equal chance that
^(x) = 0 + x  C(x) + bx or ^(x) = 0 + x  C(x)  x = 0   C(x).
Thus, E[^(x)] = 0 + 12(x + bx)   C(x). We therefore have that in cases
(a) and (b) the FP will set dE[^(x)]=dx = 1
2
[ + b]   x = 0. In case (c)
E[^(x)] = 0 +
1
2
(   b)x   C(x), which, for b > x, is decreasing in x. We
therefore have that
(a) xFt =
1
2
( + b);
(b) xFt =
1
2
(b  ); (8)
(c) xFt = 0.
3Recall that the cost C(x) has already been incurred here, so the government does not have
to take C(x) into account in its o¤er.
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Compared to the rst-best, there is underinvestment in cases (a) and (b). If
the FP makes the o¤er, it asks the government to pay the value of benets from
implementation, which, if this o¤er were going to be accepted, would cause the
FP to internalize benets fully and therefore the rst-best would be achieved.
However, if the government makes the o¤er it asks the FP to pay the amount of
prots that result from implementation. If this o¤er is accepted, the FP will not
earn these prots, and therefore it will internalize neither the prots nor the value
of benets. It is because there is a 50% chance that the government will make
the o¤er that the FPs investment is below the rst-best level. However, case (c)
coincides with the rst-best solution.
Suppose, instead, that the rm is an NP. Then, as far as it can, it will exploit
its budget constraint to extract money from the government that can be used to
increase benets. With  = 1, that is, in cases (a) and (b), the maximum it can
extract is found by setting the governments default payo¤ V0 = B0   z0 equal
to B0 + bx   z0   z; that is, z = bx. Thus, if it chooses x such that the budget
constraint binds at z = bx, the government will pay it this amount. It is not
relevant here which player makes the o¤er, for there is only one value of z that is
acceptable to both players. Substituting z = bx into the NPs budget constraint,
we have bx + x  x2=2 = 0. Given also that in case (c) the NP will choose not
to invest, we have the following:
(a) xNt = 2( + b);
(b) xNt = 2(b  ); (9)
(c) xNt = 0.
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In cases (a) and (b) there is overinvestment relative the rst-best. The NPs
budget constraint is satised whereW (x) B0 0 = 0. Assuming thatW (x) > 0,
if we raise x above x by a small enough amount, W (x) will still be positive, but
will fall in value. The solution given for cases (a) and (b) in (9) involves the NP
raising x so far above x that W (x) falls to zero. Thus, x > x. In case (c),
however, xNt equals the rst-best level.
Our second proposition brings these results together and species whether,
when there is underinvestment by and FP but overinvestment by an NP, welfare
is higher in the former or the latter case.
Proposition 2 Consider traditional procurement for b >  and  = 0. In cases
(a) and (b) xNt > x
 > xFt , with welfare higher with an FP than with and NP. In
case (c) xNt = x
 = xFt .
Proof. The rankings of xFt x
N
t and x
 follow from (8) and (9). Now consider
only (a) and (b). From (1), (2) and (3), W 0(x) = b +    x; and from (4),
W 0(x) = b +    x = 0. Since W 00(x) < 0, it follows that for any value of
x such that W 0(x) < 0 we have that x > x, and for any value of x such that
W 0(x) > 0 we have that x < x. Using Taylor expansions, given that W 000(x) = 0,
we have W (x) = W (x) +W 0(x)(x  x) +W 00(x)(x  x)2=2. Since W 0(x) = 0
and W 00(x) < 0, it follows that for x = x1 and x = x2, W (x1) R W (x2) as
(x1   x)2 Q (x2   x)2; that is, as jx1   xj Q jx2   xj. From (4), (8) and
(9), in case (a)
xFt   x = j ( + b)=2j = ( + b)=2, while xNt   x =  + b.
Hence,
xFt   x < xNt   x, so that W (xFt ) > W (xNt ). In case (b), xFt   x =
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j (b  )=2j = (b   )=2, while xNt   x = jb  j = b   . Hence, xFt   x <xNt   x, so that W (xFt ) > W (xNt ).
In welfare terms the FP weakly dominates the NP. With traditional procure-
ment, social benets are internalized to some extent by the FP because it bargains
with the government, although there is underprovision compared to the rst-best.
In contrast, an NP prioritizes benets and, as a result, overprovides relative to the
rst-best. We nd that the NP overprovides to such an extent that welfare is lower
than with an FP. We return to this result and its sensitivity to our assumptions
in Section 3.
2.3 PFI versus Traditional Procurement
The above results can be used to give an overall comparison of the four institutional
set-ups - with PFI or traditional procurement, and FP or NP provision. First,
however, it is informative to note briey whether with provision by a given type
of rm (FP or NP) PFI or traditional procurement is preferable.
Lemma 3 Assume that b >  and  = 0. (i) If provision is by an FP then
traditional procurement is better than PFI in all cases. (ii) If provision is by an
NP then in cases (a) PFI is better, while in cases (b) and (c) PFI and traditional
procurement produce the same results.
Proof. These results follow immediately from the rst-order conditions except
for (ii) (a) and (b). Consider (ii)(a). Using the same approach as in the proof of
Proposition 2, since xNp = 2 and x
N
t = 2(+b), we have
xNp   x = j   bj = b 
 and
xNt   x = +b. Hence, xNp   x < xNt   x, so thatW (xNp ) > W (xNt ).
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In (ii)(b), xNp = 0 and x
N
t = 2(b  ), and so
xNp   x = j (b  )j = b   andxNt   x = b  . Hence, xNp   x = xNt   x, so that W (xNp ) = W (xNt ).
It is clear from this lemma that the introduction of PFI has widened the scope
for welfare-enhancing provision by and NP.
Our third proposition gives the arrangement, amongst the four options, that
yields the greatest welfare.
Proposition 4 Assume that b >  and  = 0. In case (a) welfare is highest
with an NP and PFI if b < 3, but with an FP and traditional procurement if
b > 3. In case (b) welfare is highest with an FP and traditional procurement. In
case (c) welfare is lowest with an FP and PFI, but the other three arrangements
all yield the rst-best solution.
Proof. Case (a). From Propositions 1 and 2, either an NP with PFI, or an FP
with traditional procurement, yields the highest welfare. Since
xNp   x = b  
and
xFt   x = ( + b)=2, we have that xNp   x R xFt   x as b R 3. Thus,
W (xNt ) Q W (xFp ) as b R 3. Cases (b) and (c) follow from Propositions 1 and 2
and Lemma 1.
3 Alternative Assumptions
In this section we examine the e¤ects of dropping the assumptions that b >  and
 = 0.
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3.1 b  
Suppose that b  ; that is, assume that the dominant e¤ect of an innovation is
on prots, rather than benets. (The assumption that  = 0 is retained.) Then
a repeat of our earlier analysis gives the values of x in shown Table 1. Compared
to our results for b > , the values in the table only change for cases (b) and (c).
However, the implications of the values in the table a¤ect the welfare comparisons
in all three cases. In case (b) each of the four arrangements now lead to the rst-
best solution, so we focus on cases (a) and (c), highlighting the di¤erences from
our analysis for b > .
x xFp x
N
p x
F
t x
N
t
(a) b+   2 (b+ )=2 2(b+ )
(b) 0 0 0 0 0
(c)    b  0 (   b)=2 0
Table 1. Levels of x when b >  and  = 0
Consider PFI rst. In case (a), NP provision now leads to overinvestment. As
a result, welfare under PFI is now found to be higher with an FP than with an
NP.4 In case (c) the levels of investment by an FP and an NP are each the same
as when b > , but the rst-best investment x has changed. It is found that
W (xFp ) R W (xNp ) as  R 2b.5
Turning to traditional procurement, the analysis of case (a) is identical to that
in the previous section: xNt > x
 > xFt , with welfare higher with an FP than an
NP. In case (c) x > xFt > x
N
t and so welfare is also higher with an FP than an
NP.
4
xFp   x = b and xNp   x = (b+ )=2. Since b  , we have that xFp   x  xNp   x.
Therefore W (xFp ) W (xNp ).
5
xFp   x = b and xNp   x =    b. The welfare ranking in the text follows.
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If provision is to by FP then in case (a), for both PFI and traditional pro-
curement, there will be underprovision relative to the rst-best, but we now nd
that PFI is preferred to traditional procurement. In case (c) it is found that
W (xFp ) R W (xFt ) as  R 3b;6 that is, if the prot-e¤ect of investment substantially
outweighs the benet-e¤ect, PFI with an FP is preferred to traditional procure-
ment with an FP. Alternatively, if provision is to be by an NP then in case (a)
there is overinvestment, particularly under traditional procurement, so PFI is pre-
ferred. In case (c), however, neither PFI nor traditional procurement results in
any investment.
The overall implications for the choice between the four arrangements are sum-
marized in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 Assume that b   and  = 0. In case (a) welfare is highest
with an FP under PFI. In case (b) all arrangements yield the rst-best. In case
(c), if  > 3b welfare is highest with an FP under PFI, while if  < 3b welfare is
highest with an FP under traditional procurement.
A signicant feature to emerge from Propositions 3 and 4 is that, while PFI
has opened up new opportunities for welfare-enhancing public service provision
NPs, NP provision can only be strictly preferred if b > .
3.2  6= 0
We have assumed until now that the research into innovation and the subsequent
implementation cannot be a net cost to the NP; that is, the amount of prot
6
xFp   x = b and xFt   x = (  b)=2. Therefore xFp   x  xFt   x = (3b )=2, and
the condition in the text follows.
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from fullling the basic standards must be at least achieved by innovation and
implementation. Suppose, however, that the NP may be willing to forgo all of
0 to increase benets, where, by assumption, 0  0. Thus, we have  = 0 in
(??).7For brevity, we refer to this case as entailing a less tightbudget constraint
- compared to the case analyzed in Section 3.
Assume rst that b >  and consider PFI. In case (a) the NP now invests up
to the point at which xNp   (xNp )2=2 =  0. Thus, taking the real root of the
quadratic,
(a) xNp =  + (
2 + 20)
1=2. (10)
Hence, having the less tight budget constraint causes the NP to invest more un-
der PFI. In case (b), x increases benets, and although it is unprotable, the
availability of the amount 0 to spend enables the NP to invest. In this case
 xNp   (xNp )2=2 =  0. Again taking the real root,
(b) xNp =   + (2 + 20)1=2. (11)
As in case (a), in case (b) the less tight budget constraint results in greater in-
vestment. In case (c), however, since investment reduces benet, the NP sets
xNp = 0.
With traditional procurement, in cases (a) and (b) the NPs budget constraint
binds with z = bx; but now this entails bx+ x  x2=2 =  0. Thus we obtain
x = b+  + [(b+ )2 + 20]
1=2.
7Other levels of constraint might also occur. For example, the NP might have other urgent
calls on its funds, so that, net, it must accumulate some prot. Alternatively, it may be willing
to forgo some, but not all, of 0. We focus on the specic constraint in the text for simplicity,
but the e¤ects of other levsl of the constraint may be inferred from our results.
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We therefore have
(a) xNt = b+  + [(b+ )
2 + 20]
1=2 > 2(b+ );
(b) xNt = b   + [(b  )2 + 20]1=2 > 2(b  ).
In case (c) the NP will choose not to invest.
These results give our next lemma.
Lemma 6 Assume that b >  and that the NP aims to break even overall (a less
tight budget constraint). (i) In cases (a) and (b) under both PFI and traditional
procurement the NP will invest more with the less tight budget constraint. (ii) In
case (a), for b < 3, if 0 is not too large, then having a less tight budget constraint
this increases the extent to which the NP under PFI yields greater welfare than
other arrangements do; but, for increases in 0 above (b2 2)=2, dW (xNp )=d0 <
0, and if 0 becomes large enough, W (xFf ) > W (x
N
p ). If b > 3, W (x
F
f ) > W (x
N
p )
for all 0  0. (iii) In cases (b) and (c), having a less tight budget constraint has
no implications for which arrangement yields the highest welfare.
Proof. (i) This follows from comparison of (10) with (6), and (11) with (7). (ii)
b < 3 is the condition for which xNp is the best arrangement in Proposition 3. From
(4) and (10), xNp = x
 if 0 = (b2 2)=2. A larger 0 than this raises xNp above x,
and eventually W (xNp ) becomes smaller than W (x
F
f ). If b > 3, we already have
that W (xFf ) > W (x
N
p ) for 0 = 0; a higher value of 0 strengthens this inequality.
(iii) In case (b), if 0 = 0, xNp > x
 and an NP under traditional procurement is
not the preferred arrangement. Since dxNp =d0 > 0, dW (x
N
p )=d0 < 0, so that
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this arrangement is still not preferred. In case (c) since xNp = 0 for all 0  0,
dw(xNp )=d0 = 0.
Since dxNp =d0 > 0, the existence of a less tight budget constraint can have a
positive e¤ect on welfare if xNp < x
 when (as in Section 3) the budget constraint
is tight. However, a su¢ ciently large value of 0 can have a negative e¤ect on
welfare by causing excessive investment by the NP under PFI.
If, instead, b  , no changes are required to our conclusions in the previous
sub-section about which form of provision yields the greatest welfare.
4 Illustrations
In the light of these results, we now discuss some examples, applying our results
to highlight circumstances where one institutional arrangement is preferable to
another.
Case 7 Protable quality improvement
Investment in building quality can raise both social benet and reduce main-
tenance costs. For example, better school buildings with less frequent need for
repairs also lead to fewer disruptions and help to create a good learning envi-
ronment; and higher-quality hospital buildings reduce disruptions and generate a
better healing environment. Construction of roads is another example where in-
vestment can raise both prot and benet. In all these cases, our results suggest
that the use of PFI is desirable. If the e¤ect of investment on maintenance cost is
relatively large, welfare will be maximized maximized by FP provision; but if the
e¤ect of investment on maintenance is relatively small, NP provision is preferable.
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It is interesting to note that it is precisely for building schools, roads and hos-
pitals that PFI with an FP is being used in the UK. By bundling the building and
maintenance functions of infrastructure provision, PFI gives incentives to the con-
tractor to internalize the e¤ect of its investment on maintenance cost. As contracts
tend to be long-lived (generally about 25 years), better design has the potential
to translate into signicantly greater prots, by reducing the future stream of
maintenance cost.
The protable quality improvement scenario may also apply for free-standing
projects, such as leisure centres and nursing homes, where users are charged a
fee and where there is competition among providers, so that a higher quality of
service may well raise total revenues and prots. Thus, also for these types of
services, provision by PFI is desirable and if a rise in quality is the dominant e¤ect
of investment, the use of an NP is preferred.
Case 8 Unprotable quality improvement
Investment in building quality that raises social benet can also result in lower
prot because a better design may be expensive to implement and maintain. Fur-
thermore, many public services are characterized by an inelastic demand and are
o¤ered in conditions of limited competition among the private providers. If also
the government is the purchaser of the service or if user fees are specied in ad-
vance, increasing some unveriable quality aspect of the service is likely to be
unprotable for the contractor.
In these circumstances our analysis indicates that the weakly welfare-maximizing
arrangement is traditional procurement with an FP. In this context, it is interesting
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to note that the NHS Confederation in the UK recently reported that PFI hospi-
tals designed and built by FPs often failed to create a good healing environment
with less noise and more daylight.8
Case 9 Cost cutting at the expense of quality
Investments that decrease costs may have the side-e¤ect of reducing social
benet. This may be in the form of reduced safety, for example in railway main-
tenance or air tra¢ c control, but may relate to any quality aspect of the service
(e.g. quality of health care). In this case our analysis indicates that the preferred
arrangement for provision is highly senstive to parameter values. If, however, the
rst-best solution is to have no such investments, then provision by an NP, either
through PFI or traditional procurement, is the weakly preferred arrangement.
In the UK the healthcare system is changing fast, and signicant parts of
provision are being put in private hands. If there is concern that provision by
FPs will lead to lower welfare through cost cutting at the expense of quality, this
concern may be alleviated by reliance on NPs. If we broaden our analysis to allow
for the possibility that rms may have more than one option as to whcih kind of
investment they make, investment in quality improvement also being feasible, then
the broad indication of our analysis is that, with provision by an NP, PFI may be
preferable to traditional procurement.
8See PublicPrivateFinance, 85, July/August 2004.
23
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed contracting out to a not-for-prot rm and to a
for-prot rm under two alternative procurement arrangements. The rst PFI,
whereby the rm is allocated control rights over how to deliver the service; the
second is traditional procurement, whereby the government retains control rights.
PFI increases the scope for not-for prot provision, compared to traditional
procurement; that is, in some scenarios, the optimal administrative arrangement
is PFI with a not-for-prot rm, even though, if traditional procurement were
used, it would be preferable to use a for-prot rm.
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